This lecture starts with a very straightforward question - and answers it in a complicated way.
First,
we looked at the definition of 'victim of crime' - somebody who's suffered as the direct result of an illegal action - and asked what happens
when we take it literally. Victims of crime are people we sympathise
with, people who we feel deserve something: what happens if we restrict
that mental category to people who have been directly affected by a crime? It turns out that what happens is quite unsatisfactory:
there are lots of cases where we want to think of somebody as a victim
of crime, even if they haven't been directly affected (relatives of
murder victims), even if no law has been broken (white-collar crime),
even if years have passed between the action and its effects
(work-related injury).
In other words, there's a
constant pressure to expand the category of "victim of crime" to include
people who haven't been directly victimised, or people whose
victimisation wasn't actually a crime. There is no correct answer to the
question of how far the category should be expanded: if a murder
victim's partner is also a victim, what about her close friends? work
colleagues? old schoolfriends? But the literal approach - narrowing down
the category to actual victims of actual crimes - is clearly
unsatisfactory.
Second, we looked at how symbolically loaded the
experience of being a victim can be. The sense of violation that
burglary victims often feel isn't just an emotional reaction to having
the room messed up. Ideas of personal continuity and of an 'ordered
world' are very deeply rooted in our psychology. Becoming a victim of crime - having your 'safe space' or your bodily integrity violated - can
be deeply disturbing, destroying feelings of security which we thought
we could rely on. Ironically, this experience is often all the more
upsetting for people who previously felt confident and self-reliant;
attitudes of fatalism and keeping your head down aren't ideal as far as
getting on in life is concerned, but for recovering from being a victim
of crime they're very appropriate.
Perhaps the key point about the
symbolic experience of being a victim is that it's one that we've all
had, whether or not we've been a victim of crime - and we all know how
upsetting it is. I think this has a lot to do with the way we think
about victims of crime. We want those who deserve sympathy to get it -
just as we'd want it for ourselves: so we expand the category of 'victim
of crime' to include asbestosis victims, Bhopal victims, victims'
relatives and so on. At the same time, we don't want anyone who doesn't deserve sympathy to get it, so we watch victims suspiciously to see whether they're sufficiently deserving or not.
Maybe
it's possible to step out of this difficult psychological terrain
altogether, and talk about avoidable suffering and harm without
labelling those who suffer as 'victims'. Writers in the 'social harm' school (such as Richard Garside and Paddy Hillyard) argue that many forms of avoidable harm
don't have an identifiable 'offender' at all: if we keep thinking in terms of
individual victims being hurt by
individual offenders, we may be focusing attention on the wrong thing.
On
the other hand, the experience of being a victim - and the sympathies which victims arouse - are universal and powerful; perhaps the concept of victim is valuable and needs to be held on to. (At least for the duration of this unit!)
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